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  • A quick summary on Sentient Platonism

    Sentience Platonism is the idea that experiences exist by themselves, regardless of the sentient beings who experience them. How is that possible? Our minds could be like radio receivers capable of connecting some “station”. The mind, as the radio-receiver, does not generate anything new, but connects to something that preexists.

    Is it compatible with emergentism? No, it’s just the opposite. The “radio receivers” metaphor is a type of immersionism (the symmetrical hypothesis of emergentism). Is it compatible with the simulation hypothesis? Yes. Sentience Platonism can be reinforced by the idea that perhaps we live in a simulation and beings may be “instantiated” from an ideal object, in the same way as “instances” of software objects in “Object-Oriented Programming“.

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  • Implications of a plausible Sentience Platonism in the prevention of suffering

    Even if the probability of Sentience Platonism were extremely small, while there is a higher than zero probability, and considering that is not very clear where sentience comes from, we might think twice before disregarding this idea, because should it be true, its implications for preventing suffering would be immense.

    In Sentience Platonism we can consider at least three possibilities. In all three cases I am going to talk about a platonic experience that generates in some way several conventional experiences and I will analyze, assuming that this hypothesis was true, what would be its consequences in terms of relief and prevention of suffering.

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  • Monism, dualism, trialism, quadrialism and beyond

    “Monistic theories (monism) defend a single type of substance that composes reality (for example, matter -materialism-. Others instead claim that the spirit or psyche -panpsychism-).

    Dualistic theories (dualism) defend two types of substances (for example, body and mind) or two worlds (earth and sky).

    Trialist theories (trialism) defend the existence of three types of substances or three types of realities. The graphic presented here resonates with the doctrine of the three worlds of Karl Popper. In it, Popper divides the world into three categories:

    • World 1: Physical. The world of objects, not only visible, also things that escape the human eye. It is the world of physical objects.
    • World 2: Experience / Feeling. The world of mental processes, conscious or unconscious. It is the place where feelings of pain, pleasure and thought occur. It is the world of subjective experiences.
    • World 3: Ideas / Knowledge. It is the world where objective knowledge is found.

    In his book “In search of a better world”, in the first of his articles (“Knowledge and configuration of reality”), Popper speaks of three worlds. World 1, the material; world 2, that of experience, and world 3, that of the products of the human mind; and indicates that it seems clear that world 1 is the creator of world 2.

    In a way trialism could be considered a level of complexity sufficient to represent all theories, but from other approaches, it may not be enough, and we have to go to a quadrialism (adding identity as a fourth element) and even go further. A complete simulation environment must support monism, dualism, trialism, quadrialism, etc.”

    Source: What are the different types of elements that constitute reality in its most essential aspect?

  • The metaphysics of the end of suffering

    Things do not fall down, but are attracted to the center of planet Earth, this being a model that can be complicated including other celestial bodies. The difference is not important at the local level, but it is fundamental to understand it if our plan includes escaping from the planet. In the same way, knowing what sentience really is (Open IndividualismEmpty Individualism) does not seem very important if this in practice manifests itself in other ways (Closed Individualism), but in a project that pretends to escape from all suffering it is absolutely essential. Of course, this may sound as far-fetched and ambitious as escaping the gravity of planet Earth. A few centuries ago no one in his right mind would have proposed something like that, or if he had, he would have been ridiculed as a pretentious madman.

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  • Consciousness and the binding-problem

    While panpsychism sounds crazy, it is actually a highly viable theory of consciousness, as long as it is distinguished from animism: the view that everything is alive and therefore possesses agency, intentionality, thoughts, emotions, etc. Elementary particles almost certainly are not endowed any of these attributes, but according to (my take on) panpsychism, they have a very fundamental kind of consciousness, perhaps something akin to the feeling of presence or “being there.” —Kenneth Shinozuka

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  • Simulating philosophical hypotheses about sentience

    Simulations can be used to understand and evaluate the different theories and metaphysical hypotheses in relation to sentience. We can use simulations as educational tools to better understanding of the different hypotheses, theories, paradigms and worldviews on sentience, as well as their implications, providing clarity in the debate about the details and alternatives within each of the theories. Also, simulations can help in the search of good arguments to assess the plausibility of the different theories, so that we can have better criteria to allocate more or less resources to investigate or take into account one or the other within a plan to reduce future suffering.

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  • Empty, Open and Closed Individualism

    …it is common to access some memory of adolescence and to be ashamed of oneself, of what we did or even of what we thought at that moment. It seems as if someone else has done it. It can become humiliating or almost inconceivable that we would have been able to think or do such a thing. But this is explained simply if we accept that we are precisely talking about another person: my “I of the past”. Every millisecond (or minimum unit of time) we are a different person. This is called Empty Individualism.

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  • The Legend of Simurgh

    The Simurgh features strongly in Persian mythology and a number of the great epic poems of Persian literature. It is said to be a mixture of peacock, griffon and lion symbolises the union of heaven and earth.

    In his epic poem The Conference of the Birds, Fariduddin Attar describes how millions of birds went in search for their perfect king, the great bird Simurgh. Many of the birds were killed during their ordeals in search of the Simurgh – climbing high peaks and plunging into dark valleys as well as fighting their own doubts and fears.

    At the end of their search only thirty birds remain to reach the gates of Simurgh’s palace. They all alight onto the throne or masnad which is described as being the seat of the Majesty and the Glory. The throne, however, remains empty and there is no sign of the Simurgh. It then becomes clear to the birds, through an inner glow which spreads through them all, that they, together, make up the Presence of the Simurgh and that the Simurgh is really just their joint presence. A literal translation of Simurgh is “Thirty Birds”.

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    They embark upon the nearly infinite adventure. They pass through seven valleys or seas; the name of the penultimate is Vertigo; the last, Annihilation. Many pilgrims give up; others perish. Thirty, purified by their efforts, set foot on the mountain of the Simurgh. At last they gaze upon it: they perceive that they are the Simurgh and that the Simurgh is each one of them and all of them. In the Simurgh are the thirty birds and in each bird is the Simurgh.

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  • Trialism of John Cottingham and Kong Derick

    Trialism in philosophy was introduced by John Cottingham as an alternative interpretation of the mind–body dualism of Rene Descartes. Trialism keeps the two substances of mind and body, but introduces a third substance, sensation, belonging to the union of mind and body. This allows animals, which do not think like humans, to be regarded as having sensations and not as being mere automata.

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    Although composed of two substances, mind and body, the human being possesses distinctive attributes in its own right (including sensations, passions, emotions), and these form a third category, that cannot be reduced to thought or extension.[3] Cottingham has also argued that Descartes’s view of animals as ‘machines’ does not have the reductionistic implications commonly supposed.[4] Finally, Cottingham has explored the importance of Descartes as a moral philosopher, with a comprehensive picture of the good life that draws both on his scientific work (in physiology and psychology) and also on the theistic outlook that informs all his philosophy.[5] Cottingham is co-editor and translator of the three-volume Cambridge edition of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes.[6]

    Kong Derick has also introduce the term Derician Trialism, in which he maintains the two substances of mind and body of Descartes and substituted the sensation substance of Cottingham due to it limitations, with the substance he calls Submind, which involves the processes of memories, sensations, emotions and reflexes. He also says that animals do have a submind which makes them to be subconscious.

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  • Alex the parrot

    “Alex had a vocabulary of over 100 words, but was exceptional in that he appeared to have understanding of what he said. For example, when Alex was shown an object and was asked about its shape, color, or material, he could label it correctly. He could describe a key as a key no matter what its size or color, and could determine how the key was different from others. Looking at a mirror, he said “what color”, and learned “grey” after being told “grey” six times. This made him the first and only non-human animal to have ever asked a question—and an existential question at that. (Apes who have been trained to use sign-language have so far failed to ever ask a single question.) Alex’s ability to ask questions (and to answer to Pepperberg’s questions with his own questions) is documented in numerous articles and interviews.

    Alex was said to have understood the turn-taking of communication and sometimes the syntax used in language. He called an apple a “banerry” (pronounced as rhyming with some pronunciations of “canary”), which a linguist friend of Pepperberg’s thought to be a combination of “banana” and “cherry”, two fruits he was more familiar with.

    Alex could add, to a limited extent, correctly giving the number of similar objects on a tray. Pepperberg said that if he could not count, the data could be interpreted as his being able to estimate quickly and accurately the number of something, better than humans can. When he was tired of being tested, he would say “Wanna go back”, meaning he wanted to go back to his cage, and in general, he would request where he wanted to be taken by saying “Wanna go…”, protest if he was taken to a different place, and sit quietly when taken to his preferred spot. He was not trained to say where he wanted to go, but picked it up from being asked where he would like to be taken.

    If the researcher displayed irritation, Alex tried to defuse it with the phrase, “I’m sorry.” If he said “Wanna banana”, but was offered a nut instead, he stared in silence, asked for the banana again, or took the nut and threw it at the researcher or otherwise displayed annoyance, before requesting the item again. When asked questions in the context of research testing, he gave the correct answer approximately 80 percent of the time.”

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